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Peter W. Hogg and Rahat Godil 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Canada is a federal state with governmental power distributed between 
one federal and 10 provincial authorities. Although each level of government 
enjoys a measure of constitutional sovereignty, laws enacted by the 
federal Parliament may have ramifications for the provinces and laws 
enacted by the provincial legislatures may have ramifications for the 
federal realm. The “interjurisdictional immunity” doctrine is part of the 
framework of principles of Canadian federalism aimed at reconciling 
federal values with the reality that laws enacted by one level of government 
will inevitably have an impact on matters within the jurisdiction of the 
other level of government. The dominant principle is the “pith and 
substance” doctrine, which tolerates the co-existence of laws of the two 
levels of government in the same field. One exception to this general 
principle of concurrency is the “paramountcy” doctrine, which provides 
for the priority of federal laws in cases where there is a direct conflict 
between federal and provincial law. A second exception to the general 
principle of concurrency is the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, which 
provides for a limited degree of immunity for federal undertakings from 
laws enacted by the provinces. It is the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine 
that is the subject of this paper.  
The law on interjurisdictional immunity has undergone considerable 
evolution in the last few decades. The most recent development is the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in the two landmark decisions of  
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Canadian Western Bank1 and Lafarge,2 which were decided in 2007, 
where the court shifted the balance of federalism in the direction of the 
provinces by restricting the application of interjurisdictional immunity. 
The first part of this paper will describe the interjurisdictional immunity 
doctrine and distinguish it from the pith and substance doctrine and the 
paramountcy doctrine. The second part of the paper will describe the 
history and development of interjurisdictional immunity. Historically, 
the inquiry was framed in terms of whether a provincial law sterilized, 
paralyzed or impaired a federal undertaking or subject. The Supreme 
Court relaxed this strict test in the seminal cases of Commission du 
Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co.3 and Bell Canada v. Quebec,4 by 
eliminating the requirement of impairment or sterilization and holding 
that provincial legislation was inapplicable to federal undertakings 
whenever it “affected” a vital part of a federal undertaking or core of 
federal jurisdiction. After applying the more relaxed test for over 40 
years, the Supreme Court in Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge has 
reverted back to the more restrictive approach to interjurisdictional 
immunity, rejecting the “affects” test in favour of an “impairment” test. 
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is now restricted to the case 
where a core competence of Parliament, or a vital part of a federal 
undertaking, would be impaired by a provincial law. In the last part of 
this paper, we will comment on the wisdom of this move from a legal 
and policy perspective.  
II. WHAT IS INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY? 
1.  Meaning of Interjurisdictional Immunity 
The term interjurisdictional immunity does not have a precise 
meaning,5 but the doctrine is rooted in the idea that legislation enacted 
by one order of government cannot interfere with the core of any subject 
matter that is under the jurisdiction of the other order of government. 
When the doctrine applies, the law is valid in most of its applications, 
                                                                                                             
1
  Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
2
  British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge, [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 
86 (S.C.C.). 
3
  [1966] S.C.J. No. 51, [1966] S.C.R. 767 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell 1966”]. 
4
  [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell 1988”]. 
5
  P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), annually 
supplemented, s. 15.8 [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
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but it is interpreted so as not to apply to the matter that is outside the 
jurisdiction of the enacting body. The technique for limiting the 
application of the law to matters within the jurisdiction is to read it 
down, that is, to construe it narrowly so as to exclude matters outside the 
jurisdiction of the enacting body. In this regard, the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity is distinct from the pith and substance 
doctrine as well as the paramountcy doctrine, as discussed below.6 The 
latter two deal with questions of validity and operability, respectively, 
whereas interjurisdictional immunity is concerned with the issue of 
application.  
The logic of interjurisdictional immunity would make it applicable 
to both federal and provincial laws, but in fact it has only been used 
against provincial laws.7 A provincial law that is otherwise valid in 
relation to a provincial subject matter is read down in order to exclude 
the core of a federal subject matter to which it also ostensibly applies.  
2.  Difference between Interjurisdictional Immunity and Pith and 
Substance  
The pith and substance doctrine comes into play in determining the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute on federal grounds. It is 
concerned with the characterization of the challenged law by identifying 
its dominant or most important characteristic, or its leading feature, also 
sometimes referred to as the “matter” of the challenged law, keeping in 
mind that statutes can often have more than one feature or aspect. 
Depending on how the “pith and substance” of a statute is characterized, 
a law enacted by one level of government may validly affect matters 
outside its jurisdiction, or it may be declared invalid. For example, in the 
leading case of Bank of Toronto v. Lambe,8 the Privy Council upheld a 
provincial law which imposed a tax on banks, notwithstanding that 
banks are federal undertakings. This is because the dominant feature of 
the law was to raise revenue, and accordingly its “pith and substance” 
was found to be “in relation to” taxation (a provincial matter), which 
merely “affected” banking (a federal matter). The pith and substance 
doctrine permitted the law to validly “affect” banking, even though 
banking was outside the legislative authority of the province. On the 
                                                                                                             
6
  Id., s. 15.8(f). 
7
  See section II.2 of this article. 
8
  (1887) 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.). 
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other hand, a provincial law imposing a tax on banks was struck down in 
Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General).9 The 
provincial law in that case was part of a social credit programme. It 
imposed a special tax on banks, and the magnitude of the tax was such 
that it could have the effect of preventing banks from carrying on their 
business in the province. In that case, the Privy Council held that the 
purpose of the law was to discourage the operation of banks in the 
province. Its pith and substance was in relation to the federal subject of 
banking and the raising of revenue was merely incidental. 
Interjurisdictional immunity is an exception to the pith and 
substance doctrine because it stipulates that there is a core to each 
federal subject matter that cannot be reached by provincial laws. In Bank 
of Toronto v. Lambe,10 the obligation to pay a tax was not regarded as 
part of the protected core of banking, which meant that an otherwise 
valid provincial tax could validly apply to the banks. But a provincial 
law that limited the right of creditors in the province to enforce their 
debts would touch the protected core of banking and would therefore be 
inapplicable to the banks, although it would be a valid provincial law in 
relation to property and civil rights in most if not all of its other 
applications. Such a law would be read down to exclude the banks from 
the definition of creditors to whom the law applied.  
3.  Difference between Interjurisdictional Immunity and 
Paramountcy 
The doctrine of paramountcy stipulates that when there is a valid 
federal law and a valid provincial law governing the same matter, and 
there is a conflict (or inconsistency) between the two, the federal law 
prevails and the provincial law is rendered inoperative to the extent of 
the inconsistency. Paramountcy only applies to the extent of the 
inconsistency and does not affect the operation of those parts of the 
provincial law which are not inconsistent with the federal law. 
Moreover, it only affects the operation of provincial law so long as the 
inconsistent federal law is in force.  
Interjurisdictional immunity differs from paramountcy in that it is a 
restriction on the constitutional authority of the provincial legislatures. 
When the doctrine applies, the provincial law is invalid in its application 
                                                                                                             
9
  [1939] A.C. 117 (P.C.). 
10
  Supra, note 8. 
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to a core federal subject matter. It does not matter whether the federal 
Parliament has enacted conflicting or inconsistent federal legislation, or 
any legislation at all. The province is constitutionally disabled from 
going there. Paramountcy, on the other hand, only comes into play when 
there is valid federal legislation as well as valid provincial legislation, 
and there is conflict or inconsistency between the two. When 
paramountcy applies, the provincial law is not invalid, it is merely 
“inoperative”. If the federal law were repealed or amended to remove the 
conflict, the provincial law, which was always valid, would spring back 
into operation.  
III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF  
INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY 
1.  Sterilizing or Impairing Status or Essential Powers of a Federal 
Company 
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity finds its roots in cases 
dealing with federally incorporated companies, where it was held that 
otherwise valid provincial laws cannot sterilize or impair the status or 
essential powers of a federally incorporated company (“federal company”). 
Thus, if a province enacts a law which is within its legislative 
competence, but which would have the effect of impairing the status or 
essential powers of a federal company, then the law is inapplicable to 
federal companies. 
This form of interjurisdictional immunity was established in the 
famous cases of John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton11 and Great West 
Saddlery Co. v. The King.12 In those cases, the Privy Council had to 
determine the validity of several provincial statutes (“extra-provincial 
companies statutes”) which prohibited companies that were not 
incorporated under the law of the enacting province from carrying on 
business within the province, unless they obtained a licence from a 
provincial official. The laws were not directed solely at federal 
companies but applied indifferently to all companies incorporated 
outside the province, including companies incorporated in other 
provinces and other countries. The Privy Council held that the laws 
essentially denied corporate status to companies incorporated outside the 
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  [1914] J.C.J. No. 2, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.). 
12
  [1921] J.C.J. No. 1, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (P.C.). 
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province. It was open to the provinces to deny corporate status to 
companies incorporated in other provinces or other countries, but the 
laws were inapplicable to federal companies.  
As well as the extra-provincial companies statute, a second law was 
challenged in Great West Saddlery, and that was the Ontario Mortmain 
Act,13 which prohibited all companies from acquiring or holding land in 
the province, except with a provincial licence. The Privy Council 
reached the opposite conclusion with respect to that law, holding that 
federal companies were not excluded from its application. The rationale 
for this distinction is that provincial regulation of federal companies 
through licensing is not inherently problematic — there is no 
constitutional objection to a province providing for the licensing of 
federal companies, demanding the payment of licence fees, and imposing 
financial penalties for non-payment of fees. The constitutionally 
objectionable aspect of the extra-provincial companies statutes was the 
fact that failure to obtain a licence resulted in the prohibition of all 
corporate activity in the province, amounting to a complete loss of 
corporate status or an essential corporate power. The Mortmain Act, on 
the other hand, while it undoubtedly restricted the powers of a federal 
company in Ontario by prohibiting the holding of land, did not impair 
the status or essential powers of the federal companies that operated 
within the province.14  
2.  Sterilizing, Paralyzing or Impairing a Federal Undertaking 
The idea of interjurisdictional immunity expanded from the 
company cases into cases concerning federally regulated undertakings. 
Until 1966, undertakings which came within federal jurisdiction (for 
example, banks or companies engaged in interprovincial or international 
communication or transportation) were held to be immune from 
otherwise valid provincial laws only if the laws had the effect of 
sterilizing, paralyzing or impairing the federally authorized activity. For 
                                                                                                             
13
  Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 103. 
14
  Similar decisions were rendered in the context of securities regulation. A provincial 
licensing requirement for the issue of stocks or bonds was held inapplicable to federal companies: 
Reference re The Sale of Shares Act, 1924 (Man.), [1928] J.C.J. No. 6, [1929] A.C. 260 (P.C.); 
while a provincial requirement that companies issue stocks or bonds only through licensed sales 
personnel was held applicable to federal companies: Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] J.C.J. No. 2, 
[1932] A.C. 318 (P.C.).  
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example, in Bell 1905,15 an interprovincial telephone company was 
found to be immune from provincial law requiring the consent of a 
municipality for the erection of telephone poles and wires. Similarly, an 
international bus line was held immune from provincial regulation 
regarding routes and rates in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Winner16 and 
an interprovincial pipeline was held immune from provincial mechanics 
liens legislation in Campbell-Bennett Ltd. v. Comstock Midwestern Ltd.17 
In all of these cases, the courts took the view that, if the provincial law 
were applicable, it had the potential to bring a halt to the federally 
regulated activity. The provincial law was held to be inapplicable.  
3.  Affecting a Vital Part of a Federal Undertaking 
In Bell 1966,18 the Supreme Court of Canada relaxed the test for 
interjurisdictional immunity. Abandoning the language of sterilization, 
paralysis or impairment, the Court held that the Bell Telephone 
Company (an interprovincial undertaking) was immune from a 
provincial minimum wage law on the lesser standard that such a law 
“affects a vital part of the management and operation of the 
undertaking”.19 The decision significantly expanded the scope of 
interjurisdictional immunity. Imposing a provincial minimum wage on 
the Bell Telephone Company could hardly sterilize, paralyze or even 
impair the operation of the company’s undertaking. That did not matter. 
It was sufficient if the law “affected” a vital part of the undertaking, and 
the regulation of labour standards affected a vital part of the 
management of the undertaking. There was no federal minimum wage at 
that time (there is now), so that the decision meant that workers in 
federal industries were no longer protected by minimum wage laws. 
“Affecting a vital part” continued to be the test for interjurisdictional 
immunity for the next four decades. The Supreme Court of Canada 
reaffirmed its commitment to this test in a trilogy of cases decided in 
1988, where provincial occupational health and safety laws were held to 
be inapplicable to three federal undertakings engaged in interprovincial 
transportation and communication.  
                                                                                                             
15
  Toronto (City) v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1904] J.C.J. No. 2, [1905] A.C. 52 
(P.C.) [hereinafter “Bell 1905”]. 
16
  [1954] J.C.J. No. 1, [1954] A.C. 541 (P.C.). 
17
  [1954] S.C.J. No. 14, [1954] S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.). 
18
  Supra, note 3. 
19
  Id., at 774. 
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The leading case in the trilogy is Bell 1988.20 The issue in that case 
was whether Bell Canada, an interprovincial telephone company, was 
bound by the Quebec Act Respecting Occupational Health and Safety,21 
which required the protective reassignment of pregnant workers who 
worked with video monitors. Justice Beetz wrote for the Court that the 
provincial law was constitutionally incapable of applying to the federal 
undertaking, and must be read down. He acknowledged that the law did 
not paralyze or impair the operation of the federal undertaking, but held 
that “it is sufficient that the provincial statute which purports to apply to 
the federal undertaking affects a vital or essential part of that undertaking, 
without necessarily going as far as impairing or paralyzing it”.22 Since 
the occupational health and safety law regulated labour relations, that 
was enough to affect a vital part of the management and operation of the 
firm.23  
In the second case of the trilogy, Canadian National Railway,24 an 
inspector under the Quebec Act Respecting Occupational Health and 
Safety initiated an investigation into a collision in the province between 
two trains owned by Canadian National Railway. The provisions of the 
Act authorized the inspector to issue remedial orders, to fix a time for 
compliance with these orders, and even to close down a workplace if the 
safety of workers was endangered. The Court held that Canadian National 
Railway, as a federal undertaking, was not bound by the provincial law 
authorizing accident investigation. 
In the third case of the trilogy, Alltrans Express,25 an officer of the 
British Columbia Workers’ Compensation Board inspecting Alltrans’ 
place of business in British Columbia, discovered that certain employees 
were wearing footwear prohibited by the British Columbia regulations. 
He issued a report ordering the donning of proper footwear and the 
formation of a safety committee under the British Columbia Workers’ 
Compensation Act.26 The Court held that Alltrans, as a federal undertaking, 
                                                                                                             
20
  Bell Canada v. Quebec, supra, note 4. 
21
  S.Q. 1979, c. 63. 
22
  Id., at 859-60. 
23
  Id., at 762. 
24
  Canadian National Railway Co. v. Courtois, [1988] S.C.J. No. 37, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868 
(S.C.C.). 
25
  Alltrans Express v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1988] S.C.J. No. 38, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 897 (S.C.C.). 
26
  R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437. 
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was not bound by the provincial law requiring the safety committee and 
protective footwear. 
In Bell 198827 and the other cases of the trilogy, Beetz J. rejected the 
notion that there could be any concurrent provincial jurisdiction over a 
vital part of a federal undertaking. He held that provincial statutes would 
be inapplicable if they affected matters falling within the primary 
jurisdiction of Parliament over federal works and undertakings. Any 
effect on such matters would be fatal, regardless of the degree of 
impairment or indeed any impairment at all. For Beetz J., each head of 
federal legislative power is assigned “a basic, minimum and unassailable 
content”,28 which falls within the primary jurisdiction of Parliament, and 
because federal legislative authority is exclusive, that unassailable core 
is immune from provincial laws. There is no requirement of any form of 
adverse effect on the part of the provincial law. Outside the vital part of 
a federal undertaking, and outside the core of a federal head of power, 
the general pith and substance rule would still prevail, and provincial 
laws could apply. In the world of Bell 1988, concurrent jurisdiction still 
had life, but only outside the vital part or core of federal powers.  
4.  Direct Effect on a Vital Part of a Federal Undertaking 
Only 11 months after the decision in Bell 1988, the Supreme Court 
of Canada started wavering in its commitment to the “affecting a vital 
part” test. In Irwin Toy v. Quebec29 the Court had to decide whether a 
Quebec law that prohibited advertising directed at children could apply 
to advertising on television, a federally regulated medium. The Court 
held that the provincial law was applicable to advertising on television, 
notwithstanding that advertising is a “vital part of the operation of a 
television broadcast undertaking”.30 The Court in that case qualified the 
broad articulation of the “affecting a vital part” test in Bell 198831 by 
holding that the test only applied to provincial laws that purported to 
apply “directly” to federal undertakings. Where a provincial law only 
had an “indirect” effect on the undertaking, the law would not be 
constitutionally inapplicable unless it impaired a vital part of the 
                                                                                                             
27
  [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.). 
28
  Id., at para. 250. 
29
  [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.). 
30
  Id., at 957. 
31
  Supra, note 28. 
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undertaking.32 Since the provincial prohibition on advertising in that case 
applied to advertisers, and the media were not directly prohibited from 
carrying the advertising, the effect of the provincial law on the television 
undertaking was indirect. Therefore, the test was impairment. Since the 
Court held that the loss of children’s advertising could not impair the 
operation of the television undertaking, the provincial law applied to 
preclude advertisers in Quebec from placing advertisements directed at 
children on television.  
The distinction between direct and indirect effect made little sense. 
This move was likely a result of the Court’s concern and realization in 
the aftermath of Bell 1988 that the “affecting a vital part” test unduly 
restricted provincial power over federal undertakings operating within 
the province and the Court “saw this new refinement as a way of 
loosening the constraints.”33 The vital part test continued to be used by 
the courts34 until the Supreme Court revisited the issue in 2007. 
5.  Impairing a Vital Part of a Federal Undertaking 
In 2007, a majority of the Supreme Court confirmed in Canadian 
Western Bank v. Alberta35 that it had changed its mind about the test for 
interjurisdictional immunity. The Court eliminated the direct-indirect 
distinction introduced in Irwin Toy,36 and replaced “affecting” with 
“impairment” as the universal standard for interjurisdictional immunity 
from provincial laws purporting to apply to a vital part of a federal 
undertaking. Writing for the majority, Binnie and LeBel JJ. held that 
interjurisdictional immunity would apply only if a “core competence” of 
Parliament or “a vital or essential part of an undertaking it constitutes” 
would be “impaired” by a provincial law. Impairment would involve an 
“adverse consequence” that placed the core or vital part “in jeopardy”, 
although “without necessarily ‘sterilizing’ or ‘paralyzing’”.37 If the core 
                                                                                                             
32
  Supra, note 29, at 955. 
33
  D. Gibson, “Comment” (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 339, at 353. 
34
  For example, see Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 
99, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 327 (S.C.C.); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 
S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.); Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 (S.C.C.); 
Mississauga (City) v. Greater Toronto Airports Authority, [2000] O.J. No. 4086, 50 O.R. (3d) 641 
(Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 83 (S.C.C.). 
35
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
36
  Supra, note 29. 
37
  Supra, note 35, at para. 48. 
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competence or vital part was merely “affected” by a provincial law 
(without any adverse consequence), no immunity would apply. 
The issue in Canadian Western Bank was whether the licensing 
regime of Alberta’s Insurance Act,38 which required a “deposit-taking 
institution” to obtain a licence from the province and comply with 
provincial consumer-protection laws in order to promote insurance to its 
customers, constitutionally applied to the banks, which are federally 
regulated undertakings. The federal Bank Act39 had been amended in 
1991 to grant the banks the power to promote to their customers certain 
types of creditors’ insurance against events that would impair their 
borrowers’ ability to repay a loan from the bank, for example, the death, 
disability or loss of employment of the borrower. The bank argued that 
the lending of money and the taking of security by banks were vital 
functions of banking, and the close relationship of creditors’ insurance to 
those functions made the promotion of insurance by banks a vital part of 
banking. The Court held that the vital part of an undertaking should be 
limited to functions that were “essential” or “indispensable” or 
“necessary” to the federal character of the undertaking; and that the 
promotion of insurance by banks was too far removed from the core of 
banking to qualify as a vital part of the banking undertaking.40 
Consequently, the Alberta Insurance Act validly applied to the banks 
when they promoted insurance.  
A second decision was handed down by the Supreme Court at the 
same time as Canadian Western Bank. British Columbia v. Lafarge 
Canada41 dealt with the application of municipal zoning and property 
development by-laws to the construction of a concrete-mixing facility on 
port lands owned by the Vancouver Port Authority, a federal 
undertaking. On the federal side, the Canada Marine Act,42 enacted 
under the federal power over navigation and shipping, authorizes land-
use regulation in Canada’s ports, and the Vancouver Port Authority is 
the regulator in Vancouver. On the provincial side, no fewer than eight 
municipalities intersect with the port, each with the authority under 
provincial law to enact zoning by-laws and require land-use approvals. 
Lafarge proposed to build a concrete batch plant at a site in the port, 
                                                                                                             
38
  R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3. 
39
  S.C. 1991, c. 46. 
40
  Supra, note 35, at paras. 51, 63.  
41
  [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.). 
42
  S.C. 1998, c. 10. 
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which was approved by the Vancouver Port Authority. The development 
was challenged by a local ratepayers’ association, which relied on the 
fact that the proposed site was also within the boundaries of the City of 
Vancouver, and which argued that the City by-law requiring a 
development permit should have also been complied with.  
Justices Binnie and LeBel, writing for the majority, affirmed the 
Court’s commitment to the new policy of restraint on interjurisdictional 
immunity. Although the development of a marine facility on port lands 
for the mixing of concrete was within the federal power over navigation 
and shipping, they held that the regulation of the development “lies 
beyond the core of s. 91(10)”.43 Therefore, interjurisdictional immunity 
did not apply. The Court, however, went on to hold that the by-law 
conflicted with the Canada Marine Act and was therefore inoperative by 
reason of federal paramountcy. Justice Bastarache, in a concurring 
opinion, placed his decision firmly on interjurisdictional immunity. He 
held that the regulation of land use in support of port operations on port 
lands was within “the core” of navigation and shipping,44 and therefore 
immune from provincial or municipal laws that would impair the federal 
regime. In the end, then, the Court was unanimous that the Vancouver 
Port Authority’s approval was all that was needed for the Lafarge 
development. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has a very active view of its judicial 
role and does not hesitate from time to time to reformulate doctrine that 
has appeared settled for some time. That is clearly what has happened 
with Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge. However, it is interesting to 
notice that in neither case was it necessary to rule on the requirement of 
impairment because in both cases the majority held that the provincial 
law did not touch the vital part or core of the federal undertaking. It 
made no difference to the result whether the test was impairing or 
affecting, because the provincial law would apply in either case (unless 
pre-empted by paramountcy as the majority held in Lafarge). The new 
standard of impairment has its provenance only in obiter dicta, but it is 
plain that the majority of the Court is determined to change the standard 
from affecting to impairing, thereby narrowing the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity.  
                                                                                                             
43
  Supra, note 41, at para. 72. Title to the site was in the Vancouver Port Authority 
(“VPA”), which was not for that purpose an agent of the federal Crown. If, however, the VPA had 
been a Crown agent, or if the site had been federal Crown land, then its development would have 
been “exclusively within federal jurisdiction” (at para. 51). 
44
  Id., at paras. 127-133. 
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IV. SHOULD INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY BE NARROWED? 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Canadian Western 
Bank45 and Lafarge46 are perhaps the most important federalism rulings 
in 20 years. Moving back from an “affects” test to a stricter test based on 
“impairment”, the Court has considerably restrained the application of 
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. This move can be justified on 
at least two grounds. 
First, a stricter application of interjurisdictional immunity is more 
consistent with the pith and substance doctrine, which embraces the 
possibility of overlap between federal and provincial laws. The 
“affecting a vital part” test for interjurisdictional immunity carved a 
considerable exception out of the general (pith and substance) rule of 
concurrency between federal and provincial laws. It precluded the 
application of provincial law to federal undertakings whenever there was 
any effect on a vital part of the federal undertaking. The pith and 
substance doctrine, which stipulates that a law in relation to a provincial 
matter may validly affect a federal matter, remained relevant only if the 
law did not touch a vital part of a federal undertaking or a core element 
of a federal subject matter. A narrower doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, grounded in impairment, leaves more room for the 
concurrence of provincial and federal jurisdiction and more room for 
provincial legislatures to regulate property and civil rights within 
provincial boundaries.  
Second, from a policy perspective, the immunity of federal 
undertakings from provincial law can be seen as superfluous since the 
rule of federal paramountcy already limits the ability of provincial 
legislatures to intrude into federal jurisdiction — as long as there is 
federal regulation in place that creates a conflict with the provincial law. 
Even in the absence of federal regulation, Parliament always has the 
choice of legislating if it does not approve of the application of a 
provincial law to a matter within federal jurisdiction. Pursuant to 
paramountcy, if the new federal law conflicts with the provincial law, 
the federal law will prevail. In that way, Parliament retains the option to 
provide whatever protection from provincial law it believes is necessary 
for federal undertakings. However, unless Parliament has acted in this 
deliberate way, a stricter test of interjurisdictional immunity promotes 
                                                                                                             
45
  Supra, note 35. 
46
  Supra, note 41. 
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greater respect for the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both 
levels of government. It also respects the principle of subsidiarity that 
decision-making should take place at the level of government closest to 
the individuals affected. 
Those two points of principle are what drove the Court to narrow the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, and they certainly have force. 
On the other side of the issue, is the practical inconvenience that the new 
rule will cause for federally regulated undertakings such as telephone 
companies, airlines, railways and banks. These undertakings, which are 
already subject to federal regulation, now also have to comply with the 
law of every province and territory in which they operate. Many of the 
provinces have enacted new consumer protection laws in the past 
decade, and they differ considerably one from another. The licensing 
requirement imposed on the banks in Canadian Western Bank means 
that the protection of bank portfolios by creditors’ insurance now comes 
at the cost of compliance with as many as 13 distinct licensing regimes. 
It is true, of course, that national enterprises that are not federally 
regulated also have to comply with distinct laws in every province or 
territory in which they operate, but that is inescapable in the absence of 
any federal regulatory power, and at least their businesses are subject to 
only one level of regulation within each province or territory.  
And it goes beyond inconvenience. The federal regulation governing 
a federal undertaking will have been enacted pursuant to a policy that 
has been developed specifically for that business, whether it be banking, 
telephones, radio, television, railways or airlines. The provincial laws 
potentially applicable to the federal undertaking, on the other hand, will 
be laws of general application. Provincial regulators will not have 
thought about the impact of their laws on federal undertakings, and if 
they had given the matter any thought they would lack the expertise that 
the federal regulators possess by virtue of being the primary regulator of 
that business. Provincial laws will inevitably have unintended 
consequences for federal undertakings. Narrowing the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity, therefore, not only enhances the exposure 
of federal undertakings to double regulation, it risks the infliction of 
collateral damage from provincial laws of general application that were 
not directed at them. It is true that federally regulated undertakings are 
still exempt from provincial laws that impair a vital part of the 
undertaking, but the Court’s narrow definition of the vital part in 
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge undoubtedly leaves much of the 
business of federal undertakings subject to provincial law. The merit of 
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the old “affecting” standard, coupled as it was with a generous view of 
the vital part or core of the undertaking, was to liberate federal 
undertakings from much provincial regulation, simplifying their ability 
to operate throughout the country in accordance with the national 
policies developed by federal regulators.  
It is also true that federally regulated undertakings could be 
protected from provincial regulation by enacting a federal law that 
ousted provincial law through the doctrine of paramountcy. However, 
Parliament’s ability to accomplish that result is fraught with legal and 
political challenges. In the first place, as a legal matter, it is not easy to 
design the federal law that would unarguably create a conflict with all 
provincial regulation, because the definition of conflict for the purpose 
of paramountcy has been drawn very narrowly by the Supreme Court. 
Second, as a political matter, the enactment of a law with the express 
intention of ousting provincial law is likely to disturb federal-provincial 
relations. Parliament may well prefer not to act, and arguably should not 
be burdened with an obligation to act, simply to negate provincial laws 
regarding significant federal matters.  
Our conclusion is that there is no easy answer to the appropriate 
accommodation of provincial laws to federal values. Narrowing the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity was a rational move for all the 
reasons discussed above, but the practical and theoretical challenges 
associated with that move warrant consideration as well. These issues 
were not discussed by the Supreme Court in the reasons for judgment in 
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge, despite the fact that the Court 
went out of its way — even beyond the necessities of the two cases — to 
reverse long-standing doctrine upon which both levels of government, as 
well as private federal undertakings, had come to rely. Provincial and 
federal regulators and private federal undertakings all now have to go 
back to their lawyers for advice as to which provincial laws now apply to 
federal undertakings. That advice is not easy to give without more 
guidance as to how the Court will apply the narrower definition of the 
vital part and the new standard of impairment in future cases. Some of 
the passages of the reasons are unusual for a judicial opinion, for 
example, the assertion that “the Court does not favour an intensive 
reliance on the doctrine [of interjurisdictional immunity]”,47 and the 
assertion that the doctrine “should in general be reserved for situations 
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  Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 35, at para. 47, per Binnie and LeBel JJ. for the 
majority. 
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covered by precedent”.48 It is possible that these statements mean 
nothing that is not in the rest of the reasons, but they do suggest that the 
protected core and the notion of impairment may be interpreted in 
restrictive ways in future. Certainly, the law has been left in a much less 
settled state. 
 
                                                                                                             
48
  Id., at para. 77. 
